The District contends that its plan used the narrowest possible means to achieve is educational goals. 2002). See, e.g., Brief for Appellees on Reargument in Davis v. County School Board, O.T. 1953, No. It is not one in which race-conscious limits stigmatize or exclude; the limits at issue do not pit the races against each other or otherwise significantly exacerbate racial tensions. Past allegations in another case provide no basis for resolving these cases. He writes that Justice Breyer misused and misapplied previous Supreme Court precedents in this area and that he greatly exaggerates the consequences of the decision of this case. And each plans use of race-conscious elements is diminished compared to the use of race in preceding integration plans. Brief for Respondent at 3132. I am not certain just how the remainder of Justice Kennedys concerns affect the lawfulness of the Louisville program, for they seem to be failures of explanation, not of administration. And, as an aspiration, Justice Harlans axiom must command our assent. Whenever the board finds that racial imbalance exists in a public school, it shall give written notice to the appropriate school committee, which shall prepare a plan to eliminate imbalance and file a copy with the board. Establishing a strong basis in evidence requires proper findings regarding the extent of the government units past racial discrimination. of City School Dist. In other words, it is not desegregation per se that improves achievement, but rather the learning advantages some desegregated schools provide. Id., at 744. The parties and their amici dispute whether racial diversity in schools in fact has a marked impact on test scores and other objective yardsticks or achieves intangible socialization benefits. Jefferson County fails to make clear to this Courteven in the limited respects implicated by Joshuas initial assignment and transfer denialwhether in fact it relies on racial classifications in a manner narrowly tailored to the interest in question, rather than in the far-reaching, inconsistent, and adhoc manner that a less forgiving reading of the record would suggest. 6th ed. [Footnote 17] One researcher has stated that the reviews of desegregation and intergroup relations were unable to come to any conclusion about what the probable effects of desegregation were [;] virtually all of the reviewers determined that few, if any, firm conclusions about the impact of desegregation on intergroup relations could be drawn. Schofield, School Desegregation and Intergroup Relations: A Review of the Literature, in 17 Review of Research in Education 356 (G. Grant ed. As I have pointed out, supra, at 4, de facto resegregation is on the rise. See Brief for Petitioner at 4647. Probs. Each respondent has asserted that its assignment of individual students by race is permissible because there is no other way to avoid racial isolation in the school districts. This conclusion is divorced from any evaluation of the actual impact of the plans at issue in these casesother than to note that the plans often have no effect. Post, at 46. 1 ET AL. Id., at 143a146a, 152a160a. There is a cruel irony in The Chief Justices reliance on our decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294 (1955). . Jefferson County has failed to present any evidence that it considered alternatives, even though the district already claims that its goals are achieved primarily through means other than the racial classifications. And statements of a legal rule set forth in a judicial opinion do not always divide neatly into holdings and dicta. (Consider the legal status of Justice Powells separate opinion in Regents of Univ. PICS also argues that the lower courts neglected to apply the correct strict scrutiny standard and instead gave undo deference to the school board. The decision was a 5-4 split on the Court, with both sides claiming that their position was truest to the precedent set in Brown v. Board of Education (1954). Federal law also assumes that a similar target percentage will help avoid detrimental minority group isolation. See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Title V, Part C, 115 Stat. See Freeman, 503 U. S., at 496; Jenkins, 515 U. S., at 118 (Thomas, J., concurring). 12319 (1965) (President Johnson); Sugrue, Breaking Through: The Troubled Origins of Affirmative Action in the Workplace, in Colorlines: Affirmative Action, Immigration, and Civil Rights Options for America 31 (Skretny ed. . Initial plans were implemented in Mobile, Alabama and Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, and in a number of other southern districts in the face of total racial segregation. 2d 902 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting); brackets omitted). dave chappelle: the closer vinyl. Moreover, Parents Involved also asserted an interest in not being forced to compete for seats at certain high schools in a system that uses race as a deciding factor in many of its admissions decisions. Ibid. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967) (marriage); New Orleans City Park Improvement Assn. But it explicitly cited Swanns statement that the Constitution permitted a local district to adopt such a plan. Second, broad-range limits on voluntary school choice plans are less burdensome, and hence more narrowly tailored, see Grutter, supra, at 341, than other race-conscious restrictions this Court has previously approved. McFarland I, 330 F.Supp. It is my firm conviction that no Member of the Court that I joined in 1975 would have agreed with today's decision. If school authorities are concerned that the student-body compositions of certain schools interfere with the objective of offering an equal educational opportunity to all of their students, they are free to devise race-conscious measures to address the problem in a general way and without treating each student in different fashion solely on the basis of a systematic, individual typing by race. There must be at least 15 percent nonwhite students under Jefferson Countys plan; in Seattle, more than three times that figure. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (U.S. 2007). It is not simply one factor weighed with others in reaching a decision, as in Grutter; it is the factor. Schools argue that a diverse environment teaches students tolerance and respect, and the exposure to diverse viewpoints enhances education and dispels stereotypes. The sweep of the mandate claimed by the district is contrary to our rulings that remedying past societal discrimination does not justify race-conscious government action. Although we examine the plans under the same legal framework, the specifics of the two plans, and the circumstances the Chief Justice, joined by Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito, concluded for additional reasons in Parts IIIB and IV that the plans at issue are unconstitutional under this Courts precedents. . See Harrell, School Web Site Removed: Examples of Racism Sparked Controversy, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, June 2, 2006, p. B1. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U. S. 467, 494 (1992). See supra, at 2224. Despite his argument that these cases should be evaluated under a standard of review that is not strict in the traditional sense of that word, post, at 36, Justice Breyer still purports to apply strict scrutiny to these cases. The plans are tied to each districts specific racial demographics, rather than to any pedagogic concept of the level of diversity needed to obtain the asserted educational benefits. And [p]referring members of any one group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its own sake. Bakke, 438 U. S., at 307 (opinion of Powell, J.). in No. 05908, at 3942; Research, Evaluation and Assessment, Student Information Services Office, Seattle Public Schools Data Profile: DistrictSummary December 2005, online at http://www.seattleschools.org/ 421, 424425 (History, too, tells us that segregation was imposed on one race by the other race; consent was not invited or required. 2d 753, 756, and nn. It was a promise embodied in three Amendments designed to make citizens of slaves. Code 2.60.020 (2006), certified the state-law question to the Washington Supreme Court, 294 F.3d 1085, 1087 (2002) (Parents Involved IV). Order No. Of course, if the Seattle school board were truly committed to the notion that diversity leads directly to educational benefits, operating a school with such a high nonwhite enrollment would be a shocking dereliction of its duty to educate the students enrolled in that school. Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy suggests that school boards: may pursue the goal of bringing together students of diverse backgrounds and races through other means, including strategic site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones with general recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources for special programs; recruiting students and faculty in a targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and other statistics by race. Ante, at 8. They are tied to each districts specific racial demographics, rather than to any pedagogic concept of the level of diversity needed to obtain the asserted educational benefits. 67759, at 9 (Unlike the Massachusetts Court, the Illinois Supreme Court has recently held its law to eliminate racial imbalance unconstitutional on the ground that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); ibid., n.1. The other plaintiffs all challenged assignments to certain specialized schools, and the District Court found these assignments, which are no longer at issue in this case, unconstitutional. . Although remedying the effects of past intentional discrimination is a compelling interest under the strict scrutiny test, see Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U. S. 467, 494, that interest is not involved here because the Seattle schools were never segregated by law nor subject to court-ordered desegregation, and the desegregation decree to which the Jefferson County schools were previously subject has been dissolved. Not everyone welcomed this Courts decision in Brown. 547 U. S. __ (2006). v. Swann, 402 U. S. 43, 46 (1971) (no absolute prohibition against [the] use of mathematical ratios as a starting point); Swann, 402 U. S., at 2425 (approving the use of a ratio reflecting the racial composition of the whole school system as a useful starting point, but not as an inflexible requirement). Furthermore, it was only used in a limited number of schoolsthose that were both over subscribed and relatively unintegrated. Section 5. Parents Involved commenced this suit in the Western District of Washington, alleging that Seattles use of race in assignments violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,[Footnote 4] Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,[Footnote 5] and the Washington Civil Rights Act. However, the actual hard-won gain in these cases is the elimination of the vestiges of the system of state-enforced racial separation that once existed in Louisville. If those students were considered for a whole range of their talents and school needs with race as just one consideration, Grutter would have some application. As these programs demonstrate, every time the government uses racial criteria to bring the races together, post, at 29, someone gets excluded, and the person excluded suffers an injury solely because of his or her race. The District, however, argues that its consideration of race is to further the compelling state interest of achieving the beneficial effects of racial diversity. How does one tell when a racial classification is invidious? The student assignment plan of Seattle Public Schools and Jefferson County Public Schools does not meet the narrowly tailored and compelling interest requirements for a race-based assignment plan because it is used only to achieve "racial balance." Justice Breyers dissent takes a different approach to these cases, one that fails to ground the result it would reach in law. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. v. Detiege, 358 U. S. 54 (1958) (per curiam) (public parks); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U. S. 903 (1956) (per curiam) (buses); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U. S. 879 (1955) (per curiam) (golf courses); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U. S. 877 (1955) (per curiam) (beaches). In fact, without being exhaustive, I have counted 51 federal statutes that use racial classifications. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U. S. 467, 494496 (1992). There was no doubt that the county had operated a dual school system, McDaniel, supra, at 41, and no one questions that the obligation to disestablish a school system segregated by law can include race-conscious remedieswhether or not a court had issued an order to that effect. Finally, it lists several race-neutral alternatives that were considered (such as a lottery system, the use of poverty as a proxy for race, and regional assignments) and argues that they would not have been as effective as the plan that is the subject of this litigation. Our ruling on the merits simply stated that the appeal was dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. School Comm. Like the dissent, the segregationists repeatedly cautioned the Court to consider practicalities and not to embrace too theoretical a view of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. In an effort to achieve its desired racial balance in its popular high schools, the Seattle school In making such a determination, we have deferred to state authorities only once, see Grutter, 539 U. S., at 328330, and that deference was prompted by factors uniquely relevant to higher education. . The District first gave priority to students who had a sibling at the school. [Footnote 14]. The Seattle district, which has never operated legally segregated schools or Read More(2007) Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School . Chief Justice Burger, on behalf of a unanimous Court in a case of exceptional importance, wrote: School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to formulate and implement educational policy and might well conclude, for example, that in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society each school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students reflecting the proportion for the district as a whole. Here the racial balance the districts seek is a defined range set solely by reference to the demographics of the respective school districts. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U. S. 483, 488 (1955) (It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it). The districts offer no evidence that the level of racial diversity necessary to achieve the asserted educational benefits happens to coincide with the racial demographics of the respective districts, or rather the districts white/nonwhite or black/other balance, since that is the only diversity addressed by the plans. First, no casenot Adarand, Gratz, Grutter, or any otherhas ever held that the test of strict scrutiny means that all racial classificationsno matter whether they seek to include or excludemust in practice be treated the same. Both, he explains, cannot be true. There, a Georgia school board voluntarily adopted a desegregation plan. The dissent accuses me of feel[ing] confident that, to end invidious discrimination, one must end all governmental use of race-conscious criteria and chastises me for not deferring to democratically elected majorities. [S]chool authorities, the Court said, have wide discretion in formulating school policy, and . Cf. Even if the dicta from Swann were entitled to the weight the dissent would give it, and no dicta is, it not only did not address the question presented in Swann, it also does not address the question presented in these caseswhether the school districts use of racial classifications to achieve their stated goals is permissible. Given this tenuous relationship between forced racial mixing and improved educational results for black children, the dissent cannot plausibly maintain that an educational element supports the integration interest, let alone makes it compelling. And in each city, the school boards plans have evolved over time in ways that progressively diminish the plans use of explicit race-conscious criteria. of Los Angeles, 458 U. S. 527 (1982), post, at 24, in which a state referendum prohibiting a race-based assignment plan was challenged, is inappositein Crawford the Court again expressly reserved the question presented by these cases. The plurality refers to no case in support of its demand. Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, and Justice Ginsburg join, dissenting. Though the dissent cites every manner of complaint, record material, and scholarly article relating to Seattles race-based student assignment efforts, post, at 7375, it cites no law or official policy that required separation of the races in Seattles schools. In 1956, two years after Brown made clear that Kentucky could no longer require racial segregation by law, the Louisville Board of Education created a geography-based student assignment plan designed to help achieve school integration. Percentage of Black Students in 90100 Percent Nonwhite and Majority Nonwhite Public Schools by Region, 19501954 to 2000, Fall Enrollment. in No. As to recruiting faculty on the basis of race, both cities have tried, but only as one part of a broader program. The plans here are not tailored to achieving a degree of diversity necessary to realize the asserted educational benefits; instead the plans are tailored, in the words of Seattles Manager of Enrollment Planning, Technical Support, and Demographics, to the goal established by the school board of attain-ing a level of diversity within the schools that approximates the districts overall demographics. App. Each plan is the product of a process that has sought to enhance student choice, while diminishing the need for mandatory busing. The Chief Justice rejects the conclusion that the racial classifications at issue here should be viewed differently than others, because they do not impose burdens on one race alone and do not stigmatize or exclude. Cf. In Seattle School Dist. This working backward to achieve a particular type of racial balance, rather than working forward from some demonstration of the level of diversity that provides the purported benefits, is a fatal flaw under our existing precedent. Ohio adds that a district may object to the enrollment of a native student in an adjacent or other district in order to maintain an appropriate racial balance. 3313.98 (F)(1)(a). No. ORAL ARGUMENT OF HARRY J.F. The sample includes districts in urban areas of all sizes, suburbs (e.g., Arlington County, Virginia) and rural areas (e.g., Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, and Raleigh County, West Virginia). The district assigns students to nonmagnet schools in one of two ways: Parents of kindergartners, first-graders, and students new to the district may submit an application indicating a first and second choice among the schools within their cluster; students who do not submit such an application are assigned within the cluster by the district. Because of its importance, I shall repeat what this Court said about the matter in Swann. Similarly, Jefferson Countys use of racial classifications has only a minimal effect on the assignment of students. Independent School Dist., 719 S.W. 2d 350, 352353 (Tex. To Seattle School Dist. of Plainfield, Union Cty., 45 N.J. Pluralism also affords some opportunity for experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for educational excellence); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97, 104 (1968) (Judicial interposition in the operation of the public school system of the Nation raises problems requiring care and restraint. It is clear to us that focusing simply on demographic issues detracts from focusing on improving schools). Now localities will have to cope with the difficult problems they face (including resegregation) deprived of one means they may find necessary. Students may also apply to a magnet school or program, or, at the high school level, take advantage of an open enrollment plan that allows ninth-grade students to apply for admission to any nonmagnet high school. See, e.g., Brief for Kansas on Reargument in Brown v. Board of Education, O.T. 1953, No. They were further persuaded that these plans differed from other race-based programs this Court has considered because they are certainly more benign than laws that favor or disfavor one race, segregate by race, or create quotas for or against a racial group, Comfort, 418 F.3d, at 28 (Boudin, C.J., concurring), and they are far from the original evils at which the Fourteenth Amendment was addressed, id., at 29; 426 F.3d, at 1195 (Kozinski, J., concurring). Code 49.60.400(1) (2006). A non-profit group, Parents Involved in Community Schools, sued the District, arguing that the racial tiebreaker violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Washington state law. 377 F.3d 949, 969 (9th Cir. For this purpose, administrators cataloged the racial makeup of each neighborhood housing block. See Brief for Respondents in No. The latter approach would be informed by Grutter, though the criteria relevant to student placement would differ based on the students age, the parents needs, and the schools role. 10226e3(b) (1999). Each locality is free to tailor local programs to local needs. 458 U. S., at 472, n.15. When the court made this determination in 2000, it did so in the context of the Louisville desegregation plan that the board had adopted in 1996. Grutter, supra, at 364365 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (citing sources); see also Fordice, 505 U. S., at 748749 (Thomas, J., concurring). See post, at 3435. From Swann to Grutter, this Courts decisions have emphasized this distinction, recognizing that the fate of race relations in this country depends upon unity among our children, for unless our children begin to learn together, there is little hope that our people will ever learn to live together. Milliken, 418 U. S., at 783 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In Brown V. Board of Education, the court ruled that 'separate but equal' was an unconstitutional provision and that the practice of segregation was 'inherently unequal'. Both Grutter and Gratz applied a strict scrutiny analysis and affirmed that achieving a diverse student body is a compelling state interest in higher education. Nonetheless, in light of Grutter and other precedents, see, e.g., Bakke, 438 U. S., at 290 (opinion of Powell, J. The history of the plans before us, their educational importance, their highly limited use of raceall these and moremake clear that the compelling interest here is stronger than in Grutter. See Powell 35. Those entrusted with directing our public schools can bring to bear the creativity of experts, parents, administrators, and other concerned citizens to find a way to achieve the compelling interests they face without resorting to widespread governmental allocation of benefits and burdens on the basis of racial classifications. And it used busing to transport the students to their new assignments. Brief for Respondent at 2434. Moreover, the school districts did not consider other options that might have been more narrowly tailored. Jefferson County accordingly does not rely upon an interest in remedying the effects of past intentional discrimination in defending its present use of race in assigning students. The groups members have children in the districts elementary, middle, and high schools, App. 1, 458 U. S. 457, 472, n.15 (1982), post, at 5657, but there this Court expressly noted that it was not passing on the propriety of race-conscious student assignments in the absence of a finding of de jure segregation. By recognizing racial diversity as a compelling state interest, the Supreme Court will give public school districts nationwide the ability to make decisions about whether or not to admit a student based on the isolated factor of his or her race. The wide variety of different integration plans that school districts use throughout the Nation suggests that the problem of racial segregation in schools, including de facto segregation, is difficult to solve. In Johnson v. California, 543 U. S. 499 (2005), this Court considered a California prison policy that separated inmates racially. This Court recognized as much in its opinion, which stated that the school board had an affirmative duty to disestablish the dual school system. McDaniel, supra, at 41. in No. But that length is necessary. Furthermore, for a government unit to remedy past discrimination for which it was responsible, the Court has required it to demonstrate a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary. Croson, 488 U. S., at 500 (quoting Wygant, supra, at 277 (plurality opinion)). of Jefferson Cty., Nos. It should escape no one that behind Justice Breyers veil of judicial modesty hides an inflated role for the Federal Judiciary. The latter approach would be informed by Grutter, though of course the criteria relevant to student placement would differ based on the age of the students, the needs of the parents, and the role of the schools. See, e.g., Part IB, supra. PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY The statute establishing MSAP permits granting federal grants to magnet programs that seek to decrease minority group isolation. 20 U.S.C.
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